Cryptanalysis of the original McEliece cryptosystem.
Anne Canteaut
INRIA, projet CODES
BP 105
78153 Le Chesnay Cedex, France Anne.Canteaut@inria.fr
Nicolas Sendrier
INRIA, projet CODES
BP 105
78153 Le Chesnay Cedex, France Nicolas.Sendrier@inria.fr
In Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT'98 ,
LNCS 1514, pages 187-199
Springer-Verlag, 1998.
Abstract
The class of public-key cryptosystems based on
error-correcting codes is one of the few alternatives to the common
algorithms based on number theory. We here present an attack against
these systems which actually consists of a new probabilistic
algorithm for finding minimum-weight words in any large linear
code. This new attack notably points out that McEliece cipher with
its original parameters does not provide a sufficient security
level.