Differential properties of power functions

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Abstract: Some properties of power permutations, that is, monomials bijective mappings on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , are investigated. In particular, the differential spectrum of these functions is shown to be of great interest for estimating their resistance to some variants of differential cryptanalysis. The relationships between the differential spectrum of a power permutation and the weight enumerator of a cyclic code with two zeroes are provided. The functions with a two-valued differential spectrum are also studied and the differential spectra of several infinite families of exponents are computed.

Keywords: differential uniformity; APN function; almost perfect non-linear function; boolean function; power function; permutation; cyclic codes; weight enumerator; differential cryptanalysis.

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1 Introduction

Differential cryptanalysis is the first statistical attack proposed for breaking iterated block ciphers. Its presentation (Biham and Shamir, 1991) then gave rise to numerous works which investigate the security offered by different types of functions with respect to differential

attacks. This security is quantified by the so-called *differential uniformity* of the *Substitution box* used in the cipher. Most notably, finding appropriate S-boxes which guarantee that the cipher using them resist differential attacks is a major topic for the last 15 years. Power permutations, that is, monomial permutations, form a class of suitable candidates since they usually have a lower implementation cost in hardware. Moreover, their properties regarding differential attacks can be studied more easily since they are related to the weight enumerators of some cyclic codes with two zeroes (Carlet et al., 1998). However, using power permutations which are optimal for differential cryptanalysis might not be suitable in a cryptographic context.

One reason is that generally such permutations on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} are not known for *n* even (which is obviously the case in most applications). Actually, the non-existence of almost perfect nonlinear (APN) permutations for even *n* was conjectured, until the recent announcement of such mappings for n = 6 by Dillon (2009). A second important point is that optimal functions usually correspond to extremal objects, which possess very strong algebraic structures. Then, optimal functions might introduce some unsuitable weaknesses within a cipher. Some examples of such weaknesses have been exploited in cryptanalysis, for instance in Jakobsen and Knudsen (1997); Courtois and Pieprzyk (2002) and Canteaut and Videau (2002). For all these reasons, it is important to find some functions which have an almost optimal low differential uniformity. Also, the security of the underlying cipher is affected by some other properties related to the behaviour of the function when the input difference is fixed, besides its differential uniformity.

In this context, this paper investigates the differential properties, namely the whole differential spectrum, of power permutations which have a low differential uniformity. Section 2 recalls some definitions and properties related to the resistance of a function to differential attacks. Section 3 then focuses on differentially four-uniform power permutations, and it points out that the whole differential spectrum of a power permutation may influence its security regarding some variants of differential cryptanalysis, especially truncated differential attacks. Section 4 then investigates the link between the differential spectrum of a power function and the weight enumerators of cyclic codes with two zeroes. Section 5 focuses on the special case of power permutation with a two-valued differential spectrum.

2 Definitions and basic properties

In the whole paper, #E denotes the cardinality of any set E. This paper investigates some properties of functions from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^m} , $m \ge 1$. It mainly focuses on the case m = n, but Boolean functions, that is, with m = 1, are also involved. Thus, for the sake of clarity, capital letters (e.g. F) are used for denoting vectorial functions (i.e. for m > 1), and small letters (e.g. f) are dedicated to Boolean functions.

2.1 Differential characteristics of a function

The resistance of a cipher to differential attacks and to its variants is quantified by some properties of the *derivatives* of its S(ubstitution)-box, in the sense of the following definition. It is worth noticing that this definition is general: it deals with mappings from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^m} for any $m \ge 1$.

Definition 1: Let *F* be a function from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^m} . For any $a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, the derivative of *F* with respect to *a* is the function $D_a F$ from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^m} defined by

 $D_a F(x) = F(x+a) + F(x), \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$

The resistance to differential cryptanalysis is related to the following quantities.

Definition 2: Let *F* be a function from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . For any *a* and *b* in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , we denote

$$\delta(a, b) = # \{ x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}, \ D_a F(x) = b \}$$

Moreover, $\delta(1, b)$ *will be often denoted* $\delta(b)$ *. Then, the differential uniformity of* F *is*

$$\delta(F) = \max_{a \neq 0, \ b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \delta(a, b)$$

Those functions for which $\delta(F) = 2$ are said to be APN.

The APN property can be equivalently defined as follows.

Proposition 1: Let F be any function on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . Then, F is APN if and only if, for any non-zero $a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, the set $\{D_a F(x), x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}\}$ has cardinality 2^{n-1} , that is the functions $D_a F$ are 2-to-1.

2.2 Walsh spectrum of a function

We now recall some classical tools used for studying the functions from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^m} .

Any function *F* from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^n} can be expressed as a univariate polynomial in $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}[X]$. The *degree* of *F* is then the maximal Hamming weight of its exponents:

$$\deg\left(\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1}\lambda_i X^i\right) = \max \left\{\operatorname{wt}(i)|\lambda_i \neq 0\right\}$$

where $\lambda_i \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ and the weight is calculated on the 2-ary expansion of *i*. We denote by Tr the trace function on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , that is, $\text{Tr}(\beta) = \beta + \beta^2 + \cdots + \beta^{2^{n-1}}$.

The function F can also be represented by n Boolean functions of n variables, its Boolean *coordinates*. Note that the coordinates are sometimes called the components of F, but it is more convenient for our purpose to use the following definition, like in Nyberg (1995).

Definition 3: Let *F* be a function from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . The linear combinations of the coordinates of *F* are the Boolean functions

 $f_{\lambda} \colon x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \mapsto Tr(\lambda F(x)), \quad \lambda \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$

where f_0 is the null function. The functions f_{λ} are called the components of *F*.

We denote by \mathcal{B}_n the set of Boolean functions on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . In our context, the linear functions in \mathcal{B}_n are the functions φ_a , defined by

$$\varphi_a \colon x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \mapsto \operatorname{Tr}(ax), \quad a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}^* \tag{1}$$

The following notation will be extensively used in this paper. For any $f \in \mathcal{B}_n$, we denote by $\mathcal{F}(f)$ the following value related to the Fourier (or Walsh) transform of f:

$$\mathcal{F}(f) = \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} (-1)^{f(x)} = 2^n - 2\mathrm{wt}(f)$$
(2)

where wt(f) is the Hamming weight of f, that is, the number of $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ such that f(x) = 1. The function f is said to be *balanced* if and only if $\mathcal{F}(f) = 0$ or, equivalently, wt(f) = 2^{n-1} .

Definition 4: The Walsh spectrum of $f \in \mathcal{B}_n$ is the multiset

$$\left\{ \mathcal{F}(f + \varphi_a), \quad a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \right\}$$

The non-linearity of f is its Hamming distance to the set of all affine functions. It is given by

$$2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2}\mathcal{L}(f)$$
 where $\mathcal{L}(f) = \max_{a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} |\mathcal{F}(f + \varphi_a)|$

The lowest possible value for $\mathcal{L}(f)$ is $2^{n/2}$ and this bound is achieved for *bent functions*. A special class of Boolean functions, which includes the bent functions, is the class of *plateaued functions*.

Definition 5 (Zhang and Zheng, 1999; Canteaut et al., 2000): Let $f \in \mathcal{B}_n$. The function f is said to be plateaued if its Walsh coefficients take at most three values, namely $0, \pm \mathcal{L}(f)$. Then, $\mathcal{L}(f) = 2^s$ with $s \ge n/2$.

If s = n/2 (and n even) then f is bent and its Walsh coefficients take two values only, namely $\pm 2^{n/2}$. Moreover, f is said plateaued optimal if s = (n + 1)/2 for odd n and s = (n + 2)/2 for even n.

The fact that $s \ge n/2$ comes from the well-known *Parseval relation*:

$$\sum_{a\in\mathbb{F}_{2^n}}\mathcal{F}^2(f+\varphi_a)=2^{2i}$$

An important remark is that the class of plateaued functions includes all quadratic functions.

The non-linearity of a function F from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^n} is now defined by means of the non-linearities of its components.

Definition 6: Let *F* be a function from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^n} with components f_{λ} , $\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*$. The non-linearity of *F* is the minimal value of the non-linearities of the f_{λ} . It is equal to

$$\mathcal{N}(F) = 2^{n-1} - \frac{\Lambda(F)}{2}$$
 where $\Lambda(F) = \max_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_{2n}^*} \mathcal{L}(f_{\lambda})$

The non-linearity of F is a measure of its vulnerability to linear attacks. The functions that have maximal non-linearity are called almost bent (AB) functions. They exist for odd n only.

Definition 7: Let *F* be a function from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^n} with components f_{λ} , $\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$. Then,

 $\Lambda(F) \ge 2^{(n+1)/2}$

The functions F which satisfy

 $\Lambda(F) = 2^{(n+1)/2}$

are said to be AB. They exist when n is odd only. Moreover, if F is AB, then for any $a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ and for any non-zero λ

$$\left\{ \mathcal{F}(f_{\lambda} + \varphi_a), \quad \lambda \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*, \ a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \right\} = \left\{ 0, \pm 2^{(n+1)/2} \right\}$$
(3)

that is, all f_{λ} , $\lambda \neq 0$, are plateaued optimal.

The Walsh spectrum of a Boolean function and its derivatives are related by the so-called *sum-of-square indicator* introduced in Zhang and Zheng (1995) and extensively studied in Canteaut et al. (2000, 2001) and Zhang and Zheng (1999). The proof of the following theorem can be found in Canteaut et al. (2000) and Zhang and Zheng (1999).

Definition 8: The sum-of-square indicator of $f \in \mathcal{B}_n$ is defined by:

$$\nu(f) = \sum_{a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \mathcal{F}^2(D_a f) = 2^{-n} \sum_{a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \mathcal{F}^4(f + \varphi_a)$$

Theorem 1: Any $f \in \mathcal{B}_n$ satisfies $v(f) \leq 2^n \mathcal{L}^2(f)$. Equality occurs if and only if f is plateaued, that is

$$\mathcal{L}(f) = 2^s \text{ and } \nu(f) = 2^{n+2s}, \quad \frac{n}{2} \le s \le n$$
(4)

3 A new point of view on differential cryptanalysis

Most attacks on symmetric cryptographic algorithms are related to some properties of the functions describing the system. For iterated block ciphers, the efficiency of the main cryptanalytic techniques can be measured by some quantities related to the confusion part of the round function, usually named S(ubstitution)-box. In this paper, we focus on the S-boxes which guarantee a high resistance to differential cryptanalysis. This attack successfully applies when two plaintexts with fixed difference lead after the last but one round to outputs whose difference takes a certain value with a *high probability*.

More precisely, the attacker aims at exploiting this property for distinguishing the cipher from a random permutation. Then, the relevant quantity in the attack is the bias with respect to the uniform probability: for an S-box F from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , the attacker aims at finding a pair (a, b) of input and output differences such that $\Pr[F(x+a)+F(x)=b]$ is significantly higher than 2^{-n} .

We focus on the case where the S-box is a power function, that is, a monomial function on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . In other words, $F(x) = x^d$ over \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . This power function will be denoted by F_d . Power functions are very popular S-boxes for symmetric ciphers since they have a relatively low implementation complexity in hardware environments. Studying their resistance to differential attacks is then of great interest. In the case of a power function, $F_d(x) = x^d$, the differential properties can be analysed more easily since, for any non-zero $a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, the equation $(x + a)^d + x^d = b$ can be written

$$a^d \left(\left(\frac{x}{a} + 1\right)^d + \left(\frac{x}{a}\right)^d \right) = b$$

implying that $\delta(a, b) = \delta(1, b/a^d)$ for all $a \neq 0$. Then, if $F_d: x \mapsto x^d$ is a monomial function, the differential characteristics of F_d are determined by the values $\delta(1, b), b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$. From now on, this quantity $\delta(1, b)$ is denoted by $\delta(b)$.

Since

$$\#\{b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} | \delta(a, b) = i\} = \#\{b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} | \delta(b) = i\} \text{ for all } a \neq 0,$$

the *differential spectrum* of F_d can be defined as follows.

Definition 9: Let $F_d(x) = x^d$ be a power function on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . We denote by ω_i the number of output differences b that occur i times:

 $\omega_i = \# \{ b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} | \delta(b) = i \}$

The differential spectrum of F_d is the set of $\omega_i : \mathbb{S} = \{\omega_0, \omega_2, \dots, \omega_{\delta(F)}\}$.

There are basic transformations which preserve S.

Definition 10: Let $F(x) = x^d$ and $G(x) = x^e$ be permutations of \mathbb{F}_{2^n} .

- We say that G is in the class of F if it exists k such that $e = 2^k d \mod 2^n 1$.
- We say that G is the inverse of F if $e = d^{-1} \mod 2^n 1$

The following lemma is well-known.

Lemma 1: Let $F(x) = x^d$ with $gcd(2^n - 1, d) = 1$. Let G be another monomial permutation on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . If G is in the class of F or if G is the inverse of F then G has the same differential spectrum as F.

Now, we wish to point out that, other than the differential uniformity, the whole differential spectrum of the S-box affects the resistance of the cipher to differential attacks and to its variants.

3.1 Power permutations with $\delta(F) = 4$

We focus on S-boxes which are power permutations on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . Some classes of APN power permutations are known when *n* is odd but APN power permutations do not exist when *n* is even. Hence, power permutations which are differentially 4-uniform are of great interest when *n* is even. All APN permutations have the same differential spectrum, which is $\{2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1}\}$. But, when $\delta(F) = 4$, we have a number of distinct differential spectra as we show in the next example.

Example 1: Let $F(x) = x^{2^n-2}$ over \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . Nyberg (1993), proved that $\delta(F) = 4$ with $\omega_4 = 1$ when *n* is even. So the differential spectrum of *F* is

 $\{2^{n-1}+1, 2^{n-1}-2, 1\}$

On the other hand, the permutations obtained from quadratic and Kasami exponents which are differentially 4-uniform have a differential spectrum equal to $\{2^n - 2^{n-2}, 0, 2^{n-2}\}$ (see Section 5). Another differential spectrum is calculated in Example 4.

If ω_4 is large, the probability of having $\delta(a, b) = 4$ for a fixed input difference *a* is not negligible. This affects the security of the corresponding cipher. Indeed, an obvious strategy for finding a good differential characteristic for the whole cipher consists in chaining several one-round differentials with $\delta(a, b) = 4$. This is usually much easier when there are some degrees of freedom in the choice of the output difference. So when *n* is even, the power permutations which offer the best resistance to differential cryptanalysis are the differentially 4-uniform S-boxes with ω_4 small. A fortiori $\omega_4 = 1$ is the best value. In this context, the inverse function has the best possible differential spectrum when *n* is even.

3.1.1 Differentially 4-uniform power permutations for n between 6 and 25

Table 1 presents all power permutations that are differentially 4-uniform for *n* between 6 and 25. According to Lemma 1, we calculate the differential spectrum of x^d where the exponent *d* is the smallest element of its cyclotomic coset modulo $2^n - 1$.

For n = 12 (resp. n = 20), x^{73} (resp. x^{1057}) belongs to the class x^d with $d = 2^{2r} + 2^r + 1$ and n = 4r (see Example 4). For n = 14, note that 319 is in the class of the Kasami exponent 319×2^6 . Similarly, for n = 18,1279 is in the class of the Kasami exponent 1279×2^8 . It is also worth noticing that there is no differentially 4-uniform power permutation for odd nbetween 15 and 25.

3.2 Differential squares for truncated differential cryptanalysis

We know that the inverse function for *n* even is the power permutation which offers the best resistance to differential cryptanalysis because it is differentially 4-uniform with $\omega_4 = 1$. But, other attacks may be mounted against the cipher, like algebraic cryptanalysis (Courtois and Pieprzyk, 2002). Algebraic attacks exploit the intrinsic algebraic structure of a block cipher. In its most common form, the attacker expresses the encryption transformation as a large set of multivariate polynomial equations, and she subsequently attempts to solve the system to recover information about the key. In a cipher, where the S-box is the inverse function, the attacker exploits the fact that $x \times x^{2^n-2} = 1$ for all non-zero *x*. Moreover, it has been pointed out in Canteaut and Videau (2002) that the use of AB functions introduce another weakness which may be exploited in a higher-order differential attack. This vulnerability comes from the fact that all values occurring in the Walsh spectrum of an AB function are divisible by a high power of 2. Now, we are going to present another type of vulnerability related to truncated differential cryptanalysis.

Truncated differential cryptanalysis form a class of attacks against block ciphers introduced by Knudsen (1995). Here, we propose a variant where we group several input and output differences together in a subset, named *a square*, of size v.

Definition 11: Let (a_1, \ldots, a_v) be v input differences and (b_1, \ldots, b_v) be v output differences. A differential square of size v and of parameter λ are a set $(a_1, \ldots, a_v, b_1, \ldots, b_v)$ such that

$$\forall i \in \{1 \dots v\} and \ \forall j \in \{1 \dots v\} \quad \delta(a_i, b_j) \ge \lambda$$
(5)

It is called a (λ, v) *-differential square.*

Example 2: To illustrate our purpose, we consider the APN power permutation $F(x) = x^3$ on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} with n = 3. Some (2, 2) differential squares are clearly identified in Table 2. For instance, as

 $\delta(010, 010) = \delta(010, 100) = \delta(011, 010) = \delta(011, 100) = 2$

((010, 011), (010, 100)) is a (2, 2)-differential square.

Our purpose, with this new variant, is to improve the complexity of the differential distinguisher for the S-boxes *F* which have a small $\delta(F)$ but a high $\omega_{\delta(F)}$. We will show that such S-boxes may introduce some weaknesses regarding truncated differential cryptanalysis. Since we aim at presenting the context of our study only, this cryptanalytic aspect is not detailed: we only give an example in order to explain our approach.

n	Exponent/inverse	ω_0	ω_2	ω_4	
6	5/13	48	0	16	Quadratic/Kasami
	31/31	33	30	1	Inverse
7	19/47	85	22	21	
8	127/127	129	126	1	Inverse
9	45/125	292	120	36	mverse
					Our lost's
10	5/205	768	0	256	Quadratic Kasami
	13/79	768 768	0 0	256	
	17/181 29/247	768 572		256	Quadratic
		573	390	61 76	
	103/149	588	360	76	
	223/367	603	330	91	Income
	511/511	513	510	1	Inverse
11	79/183	1,156	760	132	
	109/695	1,189	694	165	
	251/367	1,255	562	231	
	463/703	1,222	628	198	
12	73/731	2,496	1,152	448	Bracken and Leande
	2,047/2,047	2,049	2,046	1	Inverse
13	303/947	4,603	3,082	507	
14	5/3,277	12,288	0	4,096	Quadratic
	13/1,339	12,288	0	4,096	Kasami
	17/2,893	12,288	0	4,096	Quadratic
	65/2,773	12,288	0	4,096	Quadratic
	205/241	12,288	0	4,096	Kasami
	319/979	12,288	0	4,046	Kasami (4,033)
	8,191/8,191	8,193	8,190	1	Inverse
16	32,767/32,767	32,769	32,766	1	Inverse
18	5/52,429	196,608	0	65,536	Quadratic
	13/20,165	196,608	0	65,536	Kasami
	17/46,261	196,608	0	65,536	Quadratic
	241/12,101	196,608	0	65,536	Kasami
	257/43,861	196,608	0	65,536	Quadratic
	1,279/12,605	196,608	0	65,536	Kasami (65,281)
	131,071/131,071	131,073	131,070	1	Inverse
20	1,057/306,539	651,264	270,336	126,976	Bracken and Leande
20	524,287/524,287	524,289	524,286	120,570	Inverse
22	5/838,861	3,145,728	0	1,048,576	Quadratic
	13/322,639	3,145,728	0	1,048,576	Kasami
	17/740,173	3,145,728	0	1,048,576	Quadratic
	65/709,813	3,145,728	0	1,048,576	Quadratic
	241/87,019	3,145,728	0	1,048,576	Kasami
	257/734,419	3,145,728	0	1,048,576	Quadratic
	1,025/699,733	3,145,728	0	1,048,576	Quadratic
	3,277/16,639	3,145,728	0	1,048,576	Kasami (65,281)
	4,033/246,739	3,145,728	0	1,048,576	Kasami
	5,119/49,981	3,145,728	0	1,048,576	Kasami (1,047,553)
	2,097,151/2,097,151	2,097,153	2,097,150	1	Inverse
24	8,388,607/8,388,607	8,388,609	8,388,606	1	Inverse

Table 1Differentially 4-uniform power permutations for n between 6 and 25 and their
differential spectra

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b a	000	001	010	011	100	101	110	111
000	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
001	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2
010	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	0
011	0	2	2	0	2	0	0	2
100	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
101	0	2	0	2	2	0	2	0
110	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2
111	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	0

Table 2 $\delta(a, b)$ for the power permutation $F(x) = x^3$ for n = 3 (a and b are represented as elements in \mathbb{F}_2^3)

Any APN permutation is such that $\omega_2 = 2^{n-1}$ (the maximal value). Fixing v, we study the (2, v)-differential squares for an APN S-box. Since the derivatives of an APN function are 2-to-1, the probability of any (2, v)-differential square is $q^* = v/2^{n-1}$. This must be compared to the uniform probability for a (2, v)-differential square, which is $q = v/2^n$. Then, the following example compares our truncated differential attack on an APN S-box with a classical differential cryptanalysis on a permutation which is differentially 8-uniform.

Example 3: Let n = 11. We consider two S-boxes:

- S_1 is the inverse function, $x \mapsto x^{2^n-2}$, which is an APN permutation
- the second S-box S_2 is defined by a differentially 8-uniform function.

Our computations lead to the following observations.

- For S_1 , a (2, 32)-differential square can be obtained. Its probability is $q^* = (2 \times 32)/2^{11} = 2^{-5}$ while the uniform probability is $q = (32/2^{11}) = 2^{-6}$.
- For S_2 , the maximal probability of a differential is $p^* = 8 \times 2^{-11} = 2^{-8}$ while the uniform probability of a differential is $p = 2^{-11}$.

To compare both attacks, we need to compare the minimal number of plaintexts required to distinguish both S-boxes from a random permutation. The number of samples needed for the attacks can be computed with the algorithm presented in Section 4 of Blondeau and Gérard (2009), with parameters $\alpha = 0.1$ and $\beta = 0.1$:

- For S_1 , the number of samples is equal to 673. Then, the required number of plaintexts/ciphertexts is equal to $673 \times 33/32 = 694$.
- For S_2 the number of samples is equal to 955. Then, the required number of plaintexts/ciphertexts is equal to $955 \times 2 = 1,990$.

This example points out that the differential uniformity of an S-box does not completely determine the complexity of a differential attack which aims at distinguishing this S-box from a random permutation: the whole differential spectrum may affect the security of the cipher. Most notably, the existence of large differential squares may lead to a truncated differential attack which is more efficient than the differential attacks for another S-box with a higher differential uniformity.

Remark 1: In the case where v = 1 and $\lambda = 2$, a (2, 1)-differential square corresponds to a classical differential. It is worth noticing that (λ, v) -differential squares do not exist

if $\omega_{\lambda} < v$. For instance, for a differentially 4-uniform function with $\omega_4 = 1$, all (λ, v) differential squares with v > 1 have parameter $\lambda = 2$. In this case, even if the function is differentially 4-uniform, its behaviour regarding differential squares is the same as the behaviour of APN functions. This occurs in particular when F is the inverse function on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , with n even.

4 Power functions and cyclic codes

Let *F* be a function from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . Studying the APN property and the AB property (for odd *n*) are equivalent to study the weights of an associated code C_F and of its dual C_F^{\perp} . An extensive study of this link has been presented in Carlet et al. (1998) (see also Charpin, 1998).

In this section, we are mainly interested in *power functions*, $F_d : x \mapsto x^d$. The associated code C_{F_d} will be then denoted by C_d . Since several results below do not need the condition $gcd(2^n - 1, d) = 1$, we will specify when this condition is necessary.

Let α be a primitive root of \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . The code C_d associated to $F_d : x \mapsto x^d$ is a binary code of length $N = 2^n - 1$, defined by the following $N \times 2n$ -parity-check matrix

$$\mathcal{H}_d = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \alpha & \alpha^2 & \cdots & \alpha^{N-1} \\ 1 & \alpha^d & \alpha^{2d} & \cdots & \alpha^{d(N-1)} \end{pmatrix}$$
(6)

where each entry is viewed as a binary vector. This code has dimension $2^n - 2n - 1$ except if F_d has a linear component, that is, if $x \mapsto \text{Tr}(\lambda x^d)$ has degree 0 or 1 for some non-zero λ .

Actually, C_d is the cyclic code with two zeroes, α and α^d . And C_d^{\perp} can be defined by means of its so-called Mattson–Solomon polynomial. It is the space of binary codewords:

$$\left\{ \left(\operatorname{Tr}(a\alpha^{id} + b\alpha^{i}) \middle| i = 0, \dots, N \right), \quad a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{n}} \text{ and } b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{n}} \right\}$$

When $gcd(d, 2^n - 1) = 1$, the weight distribution of C_d^{\perp} is determined by the weights of the above codewords for a = 1 and $b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ only.

It is well-known that the code C_d has a minimum distance δ such that $3 \le \delta \le 5$ and that F_d is APN if and only if d = 5 (Carlet et al., 1998, Theorem 5). We are going to look at the codewords of weight 3 and 4. Note that **c** is a codeword of C_d if and only if $\mathcal{H}_d \mathbf{c}^t = 0$ where \mathbf{c}^t is the transposed of the binary vector **c** of length N. The following result is currently known (see Charpin et al. (1997) for more details).

Proposition 2: Let *d* be an integer which is not a power of 2. The code C_d has minimum distance 3 if and only if the polynomial

 $U_d(x) = 1 + x^d + (1 + x)^d$

has at least one root in $\mathbb{F}_{2^n} \setminus \{0, 1\}$. Moreover, the number of codewords of weight 3 in C_d is

$$B_3 = \frac{(2^n - 1)}{6} \# \left\{ x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \setminus \{0, 1\} \middle| U_d(x) = 0 \right\}$$

Sketch of proof: Any codeword of weight 3 is a pair (a, b) of elements of $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*$ which satisfies

 $a^d + b^d + (a+b)^d = 0$ with $a \neq b$

Shifting by a^{-1} we get $1 + (b/a)^d + (1 + (b/a))^d = 0$.

Let $W_3 = \{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \setminus \{0, 1\} | U_d(x) = 0\}$. For any $x \in W_3$, we have $x + 1 \in W_3$ and then get, by shift, $\#W_3(2^n - 1)/2$ distinct codewords. Moreover, each codeword is taken three times.

On the other hand, any codeword of weight 4 in C_d is a triple (x, y, z) of three non-zero distinct elements of \mathbb{F}_{2^n} satisfying

$$x^{d} + y^{d} + z^{d} + (x + y + z)^{d} = 0$$

Since y = x + a for some *a*, we get an equivalent equation

$$x^{d} + (x + a)^{d} + z^{d} + (a + z)^{d} = 0$$

which is equivalent to

$$a^{d}\left(\left(\frac{x}{a}\right)^{d} + \left(\frac{x}{a}+1\right)^{d} + \left(\frac{z}{a}\right)^{d} + \left(\frac{z}{a}+1\right)^{d}\right) = 0$$

Thus, we have proved:

Lemma 2: The numbers B_3 and B_4 of codewords of weight 3 and 4 in C_d satisfy

$$B_3 + B_4 = \frac{(2^n - 1)}{24} \# W_4$$

where W_4 is the following set:

$$W_{4} = \left\{ (x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{n}} \times \mathbb{F}_{2^{n}} | x \neq y \neq y + 1 \text{ and } U_{d}(x) = U_{d}(y) \right\}$$
(7)

According to Definition 8, it is clear that the sum-of-square indicator is related to the quantity $\#W_4$. A precise relationship is obtained when $x \mapsto x^d$ is a permutation.

Proposition 3: Let W_4 be the set defined by (7). Let $f(x) = Tr(x^d)$ where d is coprime to $2^n - 1$. Then

$$\nu(f) = 2^n \# \{ (x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \times \mathbb{F}_{2^n} | U_d(x) = U_d(y) \} = 2^{2n+1} + 2^n \# W_4$$

Proof: We simply compute v(f). For clarity, we use the notation $e(P(x)) = (-1)^{\text{Tr}(P(x))}$ where *P* is any function on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} .

$$\begin{split} \nu(f) &= \sum_{a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{n}}} \left(\sum_{z \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{n}}} e(z^{d} + (z+a)^{d}) \right)^{2} \\ &= \sum_{a,u,v} e(u^{d} + (u+a)^{d} + v^{d} + (v+a)^{d}) \\ &= \sum_{x,y} \sum_{a} e(a^{d}(x^{d} + (x+1)^{d} + y^{d} + (y+1)^{d})) \\ &= 2^{n} \# \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{n}} \times \mathbb{F}_{2^{n}} | U_{d}(x) = U_{d}(y)\} \end{split}$$

since $a \mapsto a^d$ is a permutation. It remains to see that there are 2^{n+1} pairs (x, y) such that x = y or x = y + 1.

The previous proposition implies that, as soon as v(f) is known, the sum of the numbers of codewords of weight 3 and 4 in C_d is known. But, in this case, we also have more information on the differential spectrum of F_d . Recall that $\delta(F_d)$ and $\delta(b) = \delta(1, b)$ (for any $b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$) are introduced in Definition 2.

Proposition 4: Let $F_d(x) = x^d$ be a power permutation of \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , that is, with $gcd(2^n - 1, d) = 1$. Let $f(x) = Tr(x^d)$. Then

$$2^{-n}\nu(f) = \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \delta(x^d + (x+1)^d)$$

Consequently, $\delta(F_d) \ge 2^{-2n} \nu(f)$.

Proof: Set $\Gamma = 2^{-n}\nu(f)$. From Proposition 3, we get

$$\Gamma = \# \{ (x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \times \mathbb{F}_{2^n} | U_d(x) = U_d(y) \}$$

This implies

$$\Gamma = \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \# \{ y \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} | y^d + (y+1)^d = b, \ b = x^d + (x+1)^d \}$$
$$= \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \delta (x^d + (x+1)^d) \le 2^n \delta (F_d)$$

since $\delta(b) \leq \delta(F_d)$ for any *b*.

The previous relation between the sum-of-square indicator of a power permutation and its differential spectrum leads to the following expression of the numbers of words of weight 3 and 4 in the cyclic code C_d . Recall that $\omega_i = \#\{b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} | \delta(b) = i\}$ (see Definition 9).

Corollary 1: Let $F_d(x) = x^d$ be a power permutation of \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , that is, with $gcd(2^n - 1, d) = 1$. The numbers B_3 and B_4 of codewords of weight 3 and 4 in C_d are given by:

$$B_{3} = \frac{(2^{n} - 1)}{6} (\delta(1) - 2)$$

$$B_{4} = \frac{(2^{n} - 1)}{24} \left(\sum_{b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{n}}} \delta(b)^{2} - 2^{n+1} - 4(\delta(1) - 2) \right)$$

$$= \frac{(2^{n} - 1)}{24} \left(\sum_{i=0}^{2^{n}} (i^{2} - 2)\omega_{i} \right) - B_{3}$$

Proof: First, B_3 is deduced from Proposition 2 by noticing that the cardinality of $\{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}, U_d(x) = 0\}$ equals $\delta(1)$. Now, Lemma 2 and Proposition 3 imply that

$$B_3 + B_4 = \frac{(2^n - 1)}{24} \left(2^{-n} \nu(f) - 2^{n+1} \right)$$

where $f: x \mapsto Tr(x^d)$. Moreover, it is known from Proposition 4 that

$$2^{-n}\nu(f) = \sum_{b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \delta(b)^2 = \sum_{i=0}^{2^n} i^2 \omega_i$$
(8)

which leads to the result.

Another consequence of Proposition 4 is that the differential spectrum of a differentially 4-uniform power permutation is determined by its sum-of-square indicator v(f).

Corollary 2: Let $F_d(x) = x^d$ a power permutation of \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , that is, with $gcd(2^n - 1, d) = 1$. Assume that $\delta(F_d) = 4$. Then, its differential spectrum is given by

$$\omega_2 = 2^{n-1} - 2\omega_4 \text{ and } \omega_4 = \frac{\nu(f)}{2^{n+3}} - 2^{n-2}$$
(9)

where $f(x) = Tr(x^d)$. Consequently, $\nu(f) = 2^{n+3}\kappa$ with $2^{n-2} < \kappa \le 2^{n-1}$. In particular, if $\kappa = 2^{n-1}$ then $\omega_2 = 0$.

Proof: Equation (8) can be written as

$$2^{-n}\nu(f) = 2^2\omega_2 + 2^4\omega_4$$
 with $2\omega_2 + 4\omega_4 = 2^n$

By replacing ω_2 by $(2^{n-1} - 2\omega_4)$, we get $\omega_4 = \nu(f)/2^{n+3} - 2^{n-2}$ and then prove (9). We deduce that $\nu(f) = 2^{n+3}\kappa$ with $\kappa > 0$. Since $0 < \omega_4 \le 2^{n-2}$, we must have

we deduce that $v(f) = 2^{n+2}\kappa$ with $\kappa > 0$. Since $0 < \omega_4 \le 2^{n-2}$, we must have $2^{n-2} < \kappa \le 2^{n-1}$. In particular, $\omega_2 = 0$ if and only if $\kappa = 2^{n-1}$.

Example 4: According to Definition 8, v(f) is known as soon as the Walsh spectrum of f is known. It is the case for the following function defined on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , where n = 4r with r odd:

$$f(x) = Tr(F_d(x)), \ F_d(x) = x^d, \ d = 2^{2r} + 2^r + 1$$

It is known that F_d is a permutation whose components are highly non-linear. More precisely, it was proved by Dobbertin (1998) that the Walsh spectrum of f is:

$$\begin{array}{c|c|c} \mathcal{F}(f+\varphi_{u}) & Number \ of \ u \\ \hline -2^{2r+1} & (2^{n-2}-2^{3(r-1)})/3-2^{2r-2} \\ -2^{2r} & (2^{n-1}+2^{3r-1})/3 \\ 0 & 2^{n-1}-2^{3r-2} \\ 2^{2r} & (2^{n-1}+2^{3r-1})/3 \\ -2^{2r+1} & (2^{n-2}-2^{3(r-1)})/3+2^{2r-2} \end{array}$$

Then

$$2^{n}\nu(f) = 2^{4(2r+1)}\frac{(2^{n-1}-2^{3(r-1)+1})}{3} + 2^{8r}\frac{(2^{n}+2^{3r})}{3}$$
$$= 2^{8r}\frac{(2^{n+3}-2^{3r+2}+2^{n}+2^{3r})}{3}$$
$$= 2^{8r}\frac{(9\cdot2^{n}-3\cdot2^{3r})}{3} = 2^{11\cdot r}(3\cdot2^{r}-1)$$

so that $v(f) = 2^{7r}(3.2^r - 1)$. Recently, Bracken and Leander (2009) proved that $\delta(F_d) = 4$. Thus, with notation of Corollary 2, we get $\kappa = 2^{3r-1}(3.2^r - 1)$, implying

$$\omega_4 = 2^{3r-3}(2^{r+1} + 2^r - 1) - 2^{4r-2} = 2^{3r-3}(2^r - 1)$$

and

$$\omega_2 = 2^{4r-1} - 2^{3r-2}(2^r - 1) = 2^{4r-2} + 2^{3r-2} = 2^{3r-2}(2^r + 1)$$

5 Two-valued differential spectra

A function *F* is APN if and only if $\delta(F) = 2$. This last condition means that for any pair $(a, b), a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*$ and $b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, we have $\delta(a, b) \in \{0, 2\}$. In this section, we will examine the case where $\delta(a, b)$ takes two values only, that is, $\delta(a, b) \in \{0, \kappa\}$ for any (a, b) and for $\kappa \ge 2$.

5.1 General properties

First, we observe that in this case κ must be a power of 2. This result holds for any function F from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , not only for power functions. In this general case, the differential spectrum of the function is composed of the values $\delta(a, b)$, for all non-zero $a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ and all $b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$.

Lemma 3: Let *F* be a function from \mathbb{F}_{2^n} into \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . Assume that *F* has a two-valued differential spectrum. Then $\delta(F) = 2^s$ for some $s, 1 \le s \le n$.

Proof: It is simply because in this case the function $x \mapsto D_a F(x)$ is $\delta(F)$ -to-1 for any fixed a. Then, $\delta(F)$ is a power of 2 since

$$\#\{b|\delta(a,b)\neq 0\} = \frac{2^n}{\delta(F)}$$

One major characteristic of power permutations F_d with a two-valued differential spectrum is that the sum-of-square indicator and the number of codewords of weight 3 and 4 in the associated code C_d are completely determined by the value of $\delta(F_d)$.

 \square

Proposition 5: Let $F_d(x) = x^d$ be a power permutation of \mathbb{F}_{2^n} with a two-valued differential spectrum where $\delta(F_d) = 2^s$ for some $1 \le s \le n$. Let $f(x) = Tr(x^d)$. Then, $v(f) = 2^{2n+s}$. Moreover, the associated code C_d has minimum distance 3 and the numbers B_3 and B_4 of codewords of weight 3 and 4 in C_d are given by:

$$B_3 = \frac{(2^n - 1)}{3} (2^{s-1} - 1)$$
$$B_4 = \frac{(2^n - 1)}{3} (2^{n-2} - 1) (2^{s-1} - 1)$$

Proof: The value of v(f) is deduced from Proposition 4. The numbers of codewords of weight 3 and 4 are obtained by Corollary 1, using that $\delta(1) \neq 0$ since x = 0 and x = 1 both satisfy $(x + 1)^d + x^d = 1$.

We are going to examine specific functions which may have a two-valued differential spectrum. The first family that we investigate is the family of plateaued functions.

Proposition 6: Let d be an integer such that $gcd(d, 2^n - 1) = 1$. Let $F_d(x) = x^d$ and $f(x) = Tr(x^d)$. Assume that f is a plateaued Boolean function with Walsh spectrum $\{0, \pm 2^{(n+k)/2}\}$.

Then $\delta(F_d) \ge 2^k$ with equality if and only if $\delta(b) \in \{0, 2^k\}$ for any b. Moreover, if any non-zero $\delta(b)$ is greater than or equal to 2^k then $\delta(b) \in \{0, 2^k\}$ for any b.

Proof: Since f is plateaued then $v(f) = 2^{2n+k}$ (see Definition 5 and Theorem 1). Now, from Proposition 4, we get

$$2^{n+k} = \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \delta\left(x^d + (x+1)^d\right)$$

which implies $2^k \leq \delta(F_d)$. Thus, $\delta(F_d) \geq 2^k$ and equality holds if and only if any $\delta(x^d + (x+1)^d)$ above is equal to 2^k . On the other hand, it is clearly impossible to have $\delta(b) \geq 2^k$, for any non-zero $\delta(b)$, unless $\delta(b) \in \{0, 2^k\}$ for any b.

Note that, in the case of plateaued functions with Walsh spectrum $\{0, \pm 2^{(n+k)/2}\}$, the sum of the numbers of codewords of weight 3 and 4 in the associated code is fixed and given by

$$B_3 + B_4 = \frac{2^n - 1}{24} \left(2^{-n} \nu(f) - 2^{n+1} \right)$$
$$= \frac{2^n - 1}{24} \left(2^{n+k} - 2^{n+1} \right)$$

In the remainder of this section, we will examine some examples.

5.2 The quadratic exponents

In this section, we consider functions Q_t on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} defined by $Q_t(x) = x^{2^t+1}$. Such a power function is said to have a *quadratic exponent*.

Recall that (cf. McEliece, 1987, Lemma 11.1)

$$\gcd(2^{t}+1, 2^{n}-1) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \gcd(t, n) = \gcd(2t, n) \\ 2^{\gcd(t, n)} + 1, & \text{if } 2 \gcd(t, n) = \gcd(2t, n) \end{cases}$$
(10)

Also, the Walsh spectrum of $f(x) = \text{Tr}(x^{2^{t}+1})$ is known (see McEliece, 1987, Chapter 11). It is, with notation k = gcd(2t, n):

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc}
\mathcal{F}(f + \varphi_u) & \text{Number of } u \\
\hline
0 & 2^n - 2^{n-k} \\
2^{(n+k)/2} & 2^{n-k-1} + 2^{(n-k-2)/2} \\
-2^{(n+k)/2} & 2^{n-k-1} - 2^{(n-k-2)/2}
\end{array}$$
(11)

For functions with quadratic exponents it is very easy to compute $\delta(Q_t)$. Indeed, we have

$$x^{2^{t}+1} + (x+1)^{2^{t}+1} = x^{2^{t}} + x + 1$$

And for any *b*, the equation $x^{2^t} + x + 1 + b = 0$ has either 0 solution or 2^s solutions, where s = gcd(t, n). Thus, for any *t*, we have clearly $\delta(Q_t) = 2^s$ with $\delta(b) \in \{0, 2^s\}$. Note that we find again a well-known result: the function Q_t is APN if and only if gcd(t, n) = 1. For further purposes, we will need a more precise result on the structure of the set of solutions of $Q_t(x) + Q_t(x + a) = b$ in this case.

Lemma 4: Let Q_t be the function on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} defined by $Q_t(x) = x^{2^t+1}$ where gcd(t, n) = s with $s \ge 1$. Let us consider the equation

$$Q_t(x) + Q_t(x+a) = b \tag{12}$$

for any *a*, *b* in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . If Equation (12) has at least one solution *x*, then the set of its solutions is $x + a\mathbb{F}_{2^s}$.

Proof: Suppose that the pair (a, b) is such that (12) holds for at least one element, namely y. Then, there is at least one solution of

$$x^{2^{t}+1} + (x+a)^{2^{t}+1} = x^{2^{t}}a + a^{2^{t}}x + a^{2^{t}+1} = b$$
(13)

Since we have here an equation of the form A(x) = 0 where A is an affine function on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} , the number of the solutions of (13) is either 0 or the same as the number of solutions of the linear part of A(x). That is

$$x^{2'}a + a^{2'}x = 0 (14)$$

But, $x^{2^t}a + a^{2^t}x = ax(x^{2^t-1} + a^{2^t-1})$. Thus, the set of solutions of Equation (14) is clearly $a\mathbb{F}_{2^s}$. We conclude that (13) has 2^s solutions; more precisely, by linearity the set of its solutions is $y + a\mathbb{F}_{2^s}$.

5.3 Kasami exponents

In this section, we study a subclass of the power functions defined as follows.

Definition 12: Let t be an integer such that $2 \le t \le n/2$. Let us define the functions on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} :

$$K_t: x \longmapsto x^{2^{2t}-2^t+1}$$

Any such exponent is called a Kasami exponent.

Remark 2: Recall the following identity that we will use in the proof of the next theorem:

$$2^{st} + 1 = (2^t + 1)(2^{2t} - 2^t + 1)$$
(15)

We can have 3t = n + k with $k \ge 0$ and in this case $2^{3t} + 1 \equiv 2^k + 1$ modulo $2^n - 1$. If 3t = n then the inverse function of K_t is $x \mapsto x^{2^{3t-1}(2^t+1)}$. Indeed,

$$(x^{2^{2t}-2^{t}+1})^{2^{t}+1} = x^{2^{3t}+1} = x^{2}$$

So, when 3t = n, the differential spectrum of K_t is the same as the differential spectrum of the quadratic function Q_t , its inverse function.

It is well-known that K_t is APN if and only if gcd(t, n) = 1. So we will focus here on those t satisfying s = gcd(t, n) > 1. Moreover, we will suppose that n/gcd(t, n) is odd, which implies that $gcd(2^{rt} + 1, 2^n - 1) = 1$ for any odd r. In this case, we deduce from (15) that $d = 2^{2t} - 2^t + 1$ is coprime to $2^n - 1$. Also, the Walsh spectrum of $f_t(x) = Tr(K_t(x))$ is known from Kasami (1971): it consists precisely of $\{0, \pm 2^{(n+s)/2}\}$ if s = gcd(n, t) = gcd(n, 2t).

We begin by recalling a result which is proved in a more general context in Charpin et al. (1997, Proposition 5). Note that, in the next lemma, the number B_3 of codewords of weight 3 of C_d is given by Proposition 5.

Lemma 5: Let $d = 2^{2t} - 2^t + 1$ with t > 1. Let s = gcd(t, n). Then

$$U_d(x) = (x^{2^t} + x) \left(\frac{x^{2^t} + x}{x^2 + x}\right)^{2^t}$$

Moreover, the associated code C_d *has minimal distance* 3 *for any* s > 1*.*

The first part of the next theorem was given in Hertel and Pott (2008). Recall that $\delta(b)$ is the number of x such that $x^d + (x + 1)^d = b$.

Theorem 2: Let $K_t: x \mapsto x^{2^{2t}-2^t+1}$ over \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . We assume that $n \neq 3t$ and $s = \gcd(n, t)$ with n/s odd. Then $\delta(b) \in \{0, 2^s\}$ for any b and, consequently, $\delta(K_t) = 2^s$. More precisely, whenever the equation $x^d + (x+1)^d = b$ has a solution x then the set of its solutions is

$$(y + a\mathbb{F}_{2^s})^{2^t+1}$$
 where $x = y^{2^t+1}$, $x + 1 = (y + a)^{2^t+1}$

Proof: We assume that b is such that the following equation

$$x^{2^{2t}-2^t+1} + (x+1)^{2^{2t}-2^t+1} = b$$
(16)

has at least one solution. According to (18), t satisfies $gcd(2^t + 1, 2^n - 1) = 1$. Hence, there are y and z such that $x = y^{2^t+1}$ and $x + 1 = z^{2^t+1}$. Moreover, there is a such that z = y + a. Then (16) becomes

$$y^{2^{3t}+1} + (y+a)^{2^{3t}+1} = b$$
(17)

where $2^{3t} + 1$ is computed modulo $(2^n - 1)$ (if $3t = n + \ell$ with $\ell \ge 1$ then $2^{3t} + 1$ is equivalent to $2^{\ell} + 1$). Let gcd(3t, n) = k. Note that either k = s or k = 3s. From Lemma 4, we know that if Equation (17) has a solution y then the set of its solutions is $y + a\mathbb{F}_{2^k}$. Now we want to prove that, for any $\beta \in \mathbb{F}_{2^s}$, the element $(y + \beta a)^{2^{t+1}}$ is a solution of (16). Set $u = (y + \beta a)^{2^{t+1}}$ and $v = (y + (\beta + 1)a)^{2^{t+1}}$. We have

$$u + v = (y + \beta a)^{2^{t}} a + (y + \beta a)a^{2^{t}} + a^{2^{t}+1}$$
$$= ya^{2^{t}} + y^{2^{t}} a + a^{2^{t}+1}$$
$$= y^{2^{t}+1} + (y + a)^{2^{t}+1}$$
$$= x + (x + 1) = 1$$

Thus,

2.

$$u^{2^{2t}-2^{t}+1} + (u+1)^{2^{2t}-2^{t}+1} = u^{2^{2t}-2^{t}+1} + v^{2^{2t}-2^{t}+1}$$
$$= (y+\beta a)^{2^{3t}+1} + (y+(\beta+1)a)^{2^{3t}+1} = b$$

proving that (16) has at least 2^s solutions. Hence, we have $\delta(b) \ge 2^s$ for any non-zero $\delta(b)$. We deduce from Proposition 6 that $\delta(b) \in \{0, 2^s\}$ for any *b*, since the function $x \mapsto \text{Tr}(x^d)$ is plateaued with spectrum $\{0, \pm 2^{(n+s)/2}\}$. Further, $\delta(F_t) = 2^s$ and the set of solutions are as expected.

5.4 Other exponents and a conjecture

Taking into account a number of numerical results (see Table 1), we propose the following conjecture.

Conjecture 1: Any power permutation x^d with a two-valued differential spectrum is such that d is either a quadratic exponent or a Kasami exponent, up to any equivalence which preserves the differential spectrum.

In particular, this conjecture implies that, for power functions, the same Walsh spectrum may correspond to several differential spectra. For instance, for any $n \equiv 2 \mod 4$, there exist some plateaued optimal functions with different differential spectra: the quadratic function $x \mapsto x^5$ is differentially 4-uniform and has a two-valued differential spectrum. On the other hand, some other power functions F_d whose components are plateaued optimal have been exhibited by Cusick and Dobbertin (1996), as pointed out in the following theorem. Some of these functions do not have a two-valued differential spectrum.

Theorem 3 (Cusick and Dobbertin, 1996): Let n = 2m with m odd. Let $f_d(x) = Tr(x^d)$ denotes a Boolean function on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . Then f_d is plateaued with spectrum $\{0, \pm 2^{(n+2)/2}\}$ for the following values of d:

(*i*) $d = 2^m + 2^{(m+1)/2} + 1$

(*ii*)
$$d = 2^{m+1} + 3$$
.

Note that in both cases, we have $gcd(d, 2^n - 1) = 1$ so that the function $F_d : x \mapsto x^d$ is a permutation. Since any bijective power function on \mathbb{F}_{2^n} (with *n* even) cannot be APN, we know that F_d cannot be APN. Proposition 6 implies that either these functions F_d are differentially 4-uniform with a two-valued differential spectrum, or $\delta(F_d) \ge 6$. Our simulations show, that, for any $n \equiv 2 \mod 4$, $10 \le n \le 18$, both these power permutations are differentially 8-uniform. Moreover, both of them have the same differential spectrum which takes all five values, 0, 2, 4, 6 and 8 (Table 3).

Conjecture 2: Let n = 2m with m odd. Let $F_d : x \mapsto x^d$ be the power permutations defined by the following values of d:

- (*i*) $d = 2^m + 2^{(m+1)/2} + 1$
- (*ii*) $d = 2^{m+1} + 3$.

Then, for these values of d, F_d is differentially 8-uniform and all values 0, 2, 4, 6 and 8 appear in its differential spectrum.

Our first conjecture on the non-existence of power permutations with a two-valued differential spectrum, except the quadratic exponents and the Kasami exponents, is corroborated by the following results on the scarcity of such functions. Actually, it can be proved that power permutations over \mathbb{F}_{2^n} with a two-valued differential spectrum do not exist for many sets of parameters.

Table 3 Differential spectra of the power permutations studied by Cusick and Dobbertin (1996): $F_d: x \mapsto x^d$ over \mathbb{F}_{2^n} with $d = 2^m + 2^{(m+1)/2} + 1$ and $d = 2^{m+1} + 3$, for $n \equiv 2 \mod 4$, 10 < n < 18

n	Exponent/inverse	$\delta(F_d)$	ω_0	ω_2	ω_4	ω_6	ω_8
10	41/25	8	698	200	76	40	10
	67/107	8	698	200	76	40	10
14	145/113	8	11,504	2,240	2,080	448	112
	259/1,613	8	11,504	2,240	2,080	448	112
18	545/481	8	182,496	40,320	29,248	8,064	2,016
	1,027/2,629	8	182,496	40,320	29,248	8,064	2,016

Proposition 7: Let p be a prime and $n = p^m$ for some $m \ge 1$. Let $F_d : x \mapsto x^d$ be a non-linear power permutation over \mathbb{F}_{2^n} with a two-valued differential spectrum where $\delta(F_d) = 2^s$. Then, p > 2 and p divides $(2^{s-1} - 1)$. Most notably,

- (i) if p = 2, then there is no power permutation with a two-valued differential spectrum
- (*ii*) for any $p, \delta(F_d) \neq 4$
- (iii) for any $p \neq 3$, $\delta(F_d) \neq 8$
- (iv) for any $p \neq 7$, $\delta(F_d) \neq 16$.

Proof: Let us consider $\mathcal{E} = \{b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}, \delta(b) \neq 0\}$. Since

$$\sum_{b\in\mathbb{F}_{2^n}}\delta(b)=2^n$$

we have that, if F_d has a two-valued differential spectrum with $\delta(F_d) = 2^s$, then $\#\mathcal{E} = 2^{n-s}$. But, for any $b, \delta(b) = \delta(b^2)$. Therefore, the set \mathcal{E} consists of the union of some cyclotomic cosets modulo $(2^n - 1)$. Moreover, \mathcal{E} includes {1} since $\delta(1) \ge 2$. When $n = p^m$, the sizes of all cyclotomic cosets, except {1}, are divisible by p.

It follows that $\#\mathcal{E} = 1 + p\lambda$ for some integer λ , leading to $p\lambda = 2^{n-k} - 1$.

Note that $\lambda \ge 1$ since the case $\lambda = 0$ corresponds to the case where $\delta(F_d) = 2^n$, that is, $F_d(x) = x^{2^i}$. This situation does not occur since F_d is assumed to be non-linear. Then, we have

$$2^{p^m - s} - 1 \equiv 0 \mod p \tag{18}$$

Property (i) immediately follows since this cannot occur for p = 2 because $s < p^m$.

Let us now suppose that p > 2. Euler's totient theorem can be applied to $2^{p^{i-1}}$, since p is an odd prime, for any $i \ge 1$. It leads to

$$\left(2^{p^{i-1}}\right)^{p-1} \equiv 1 \bmod p$$

implying $2^{p^i} \equiv 2^{p^{i-1}} \mod p$. It then follows that

$$2^{p^m} \equiv 2 \mod p.$$

Then, we deduce from (18) that $2^{p^m} \equiv 2^s \equiv 2 \mod p$, that is, p divides $2^{s-1} - 1$.

With a very similar technique, we can prove the following result.

Proposition 8: Let p > 2 be a prime and $n = 2p^m$ for some $m \ge 1$. Let $F_d : x \mapsto x^d$ be a non-linear power permutation over \mathbb{F}_{2^n} with a two-valued differential spectrum. Then, $\delta(F_d) = 2^s$ and p divides either $(2^{s-2} - 1)$ or $(3 \times 2^{s-2} - 1)$. Most notably,

- (*i*) for any $p \neq 5$, $\delta(F_d) \neq 8$
- (*ii*) for any $p \notin \{3, 11\}, \delta(F_d) \neq 16$
- (*iii*) for any $p \notin \{7, 23\}, \delta(F_d) \neq 32$
- (iv) for any $p \notin \{3, 5, 47\}$, $\delta(F_d) \neq 64$.

If $n = p^m$, we know from Lemma 3 and Proposition 7 that the only power permutations with $\delta(F_d) \leq 6$ which have a two-valued differential spectrum are the APN power

permutations. Now, we get some additional information on the differential spectrum of the power permutations with $\delta(F_d) \leq 6$ since we show that they all satisfy $\delta(1) = 2$.

Proposition 9: Let p > 2 be a prime and $n = p^m$ for some $m \ge 1$. Let $F_d : x \mapsto x^d$ be a nonlinear power permutation over \mathbb{F}_{2^n} . Then, p divides $(((\delta(1))/2) - 1)$. Most notably, if $\delta(F_d) = 4$ or $\delta(F_d) = 6$, then $\delta(1) = 2$, implying that $\delta(b) = \delta(F_d)$ for at least p values of b.

Proof: Let

$$\mathcal{E} = \{ b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}, \ \delta(b) \neq 0 \}$$

The set \mathcal{E} consists of the union of some cyclotomic cosets modulo $(2^n - 1)$. For $n = p^m$, the sizes of all cyclotomic cosets modulo $(2^n - 1)$ are divisible by p except the coset {1}. It follows that

$$\sum_{b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \delta(b) = \delta(1) + p \sum_{b \in \mathcal{I}, b \neq 1} \delta(b) = 2^n$$

where \mathcal{I} is a set of representatives of the cyclotomic cosets. Because all $\delta(b)$ are even, we deduce that

$$\frac{\delta(1)}{2} + p\lambda = 2^{n-1}$$

for some λ . Moreover, $\lambda \neq 0$ because F_d is not linear. It follows that p divides $(2^{p^m-1} - (\delta(1)/2))$. By Euler's totient theorem, we have

$$2^{p^m} \equiv 2 \mod p$$

Thus, p divides $(2^{p^m-1} - (\delta(1)/2))$ if and only if p divides $((\delta(1)/2) - 1)$. It is worth noticing that this condition cannot hold for $\delta(1) \in \{4, 6\}$, implying that $\delta(1) = 2$ when $\delta(F_d) \le 6$.

Remark 3: Let p > 2 be a prime and $n = p^m$ for some $m \ge 1$. Then, there is no differentially 4-uniform power permutation over \mathbb{F}_{2^n} having the following differential spectrum: $\omega_4 = 1$, $\omega_2 = 2^{n-1} - 2$, $\omega_0 = 2^{n-1} + 1$.

6 Conclusions

Differentially 4-uniform permutations are of great interest for the design of symmetric cryptographic primitives: in the lack of known APN permutations of an even number of variables (except for six variables), they are those which guarantee the best resistance to differential attacks in most practical cases. But, besides the differential uniformity, the whole differential spectrum of its S-box affects the security of a cipher as shown in Section 3. For power permutations, this differential spectrum is highly related to the number of low-weight codewords in some cyclic codes with two zeroes. In this context, we have studied the differential spectra of several infinite families of exponents and we have also investigated the case of power permutations with a two-valued differential spectrum. Most notably, several conjectures on such functions have been given.

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